TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/121889/12188900.034

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 9.0 KB | 176 lines

                a▒▐                                                          WORLD, Page 33

COLOMBIA

Noble Battle, Terrible Toll


In his offensive against the coke princes, President Barco has
dented the drug pipeline but hardly destroyed it. The narcos
lash back by terrorizing the innocent

By John Moody -- BOGOTA


    The army major was flabbergasted at the offer, delivered by
an emissary of Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha: in return for
destroying confiscated documents and computer disks that
provided a detailed blueprint of Gacha's cocaine empire, the
officer, whose monthly salary is $300, would receive $1.2
million. Cash. If he refused, the drug Mafia would hunt him down
and slaughter him.

    How many people would be strong enough to just say no? To
reject immediate wealth and accept a relentless shadow of
violent death? Yet the major did say no, and turned over the
data to his superiors. His bravery is only one unsung ballad of
honor in Colombia's crusade against its cocaine cowboys. It is
also the exception, not the rule.

    President Virgilio Barco Vargas' four-month-old war against
his country's top narcos -- Gacha, Pablo Escobar Gaviria and
the three brothers of Medellin's Ochoa family -- has not gone
as well as he or the nation had hoped. Since Mob hit men
assassinated presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan in August
and ignited Barco's offensive, the leaders of Colombia's coke
cartels have gone into hiding, forfeiting posh estates and bank
accounts; some law-enforcement officials believe that the drug
princes have even undergone plastic surgery. Nevertheless, Gacha
and company remain immensely powerful, with their pipeline to
the U.S. merely dented and their profits still enormous. And in
the past two weeks they have demonstrated that they do not care
how many people die in their showdown with the government to see
who really rules Colombia.

    Last week a half-ton of dynamite stashed in a stolen truck
exploded outside the headquarters of the DAS, the secret police
in overall charge of the coke battle. The blast, which gouged
a 30-ft.-deep crater and damaged buildings as far as 40 blocks
away, killed at least 52 and injured 1,000. The day before the
bombing, a judge involved in prosecuting the drug masters was
gunned down while strolling the streets of Medellin. And nine
days earlier, the narcos planted a bomb that ripped apart an
Avianca jetliner en route from Bogota to Cali, claiming 107
lives. An anonymous caller said the plane had been destroyed
because its passengers included five "snitches" -- people who,
like the major, had defied the Mob to help the government.

    The early weeks of the offensive raised unrealistic
expectations that the drug empires could be quickly crushed.
Jungle labs were torched, properties and chemicals seized, and
some 11,000 people detained. Today, with the war continuing but
with fewer spectacular results to show for its efforts, the
Barco administration is having a harder time making its case
that the struggle is worthwhile. Meanwhile, the drug Mafia has
struck back with more than 200 bombings and singled out and
killed at least 13 officials. By the standards of civil war, the
DAS headquarters would qualify as a military target and
therefore part of the price paid by a country in conflict. But
by blasting out of the sky a civilian airplane filled with
innocent passengers, the narcos served notice that no one is
safe from their vengeance.

    Though the escalating violence is intimidating the
population and eroding Barco's support throughout the country,
Colombian officials contend that the season of terror is proof
that their battle is taking its toll against the intended
targets. "We're winning," insists General Miguel Maza Marquez,
who as head of the DAS directs the government's offensive (he
escaped injury in last week's bombing). "The chieftains no
longer live comfortably. They are in the mountains. The best
proof that they are cracking is the level of madness to which
they have sunk."

    The Bush Administration professes to be pleased with
Bogota's resolve, though officials are studying whether it will
be safe enough for the President to attend a drug summit in
Colombia early next year. "Barco is an engineer, and so he took
a while to make up his mind," says a U.S. official. "But now
that he's taken a decision to fight these guys, he's
unshakable." But if Barco's campaign is lauded by the
politicians in Washington, it has more than its share of
deserters among the politicians in Colombia. Aware that the
specter of an American jail cell remains the drug bosses'
darkest nightmare, the Colombian Supreme Court last October
upheld Barco's use of executive powers to extradite suspects
wanted in the U.S. But last week the Colombian House of
Representatives voted to put the question of extradition on a
nationwide referendum early next year. In so doing, the
legislators effectively washed their hands of the issue and
admitted to their constituents that they do not have the
gumption to make tough decisions for the country's overall good
if it means endangering their own lives.

    Increasingly, Colombian public opinion favors negotiating
with the narcos. It is a notion that Barco's associates know
better than to utter around the office. When police foiled a
plot to kill Barco's daughter, the flinty President said, "With
common criminals and gutless assassins, dialogue is not
possible."

    The drug lords seem to be getting the message. An
authorized spokesman for one of the cartels told TIME that
Escobar, Gacha and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, don of the Cali
cartel, recognize Barco's inflexibility and are waiting for his
term to expire next August. Says the source: "They'll try to
reason with the next President." But "reason" is surely a
euphemism for "control." Through intermediaries, the narcos are
putting money behind candidates for President, Congress and
mayors of key cities. After election day, the bill will come
due.

    Having endured Barco's best shot so far, the drug
chieftains appear to be rebuilding their scorched empire.
Cocaine production, which in September dropped to a quarter of
its usual level of about 50 tons, is back up to 75%. Says a
Western diplomat: "They were knocked off balance, but never out
of business. If they need to boost production, they offer people
double or triple salary. Money means nothing to them."

    The government distinguishes among its enemies, and holds
Gacha and Escobar responsible for most of Colombia's recent
violence. By contrast, Bogota considers the Rodriguez Orejuela
mob from Cali to be white-collar criminals, who would rather
make money than headlines. While less prone to violence, the
Cali organization does its share to keep the drug pipeline full.
The two biggest recent busts in the U.S. -- 22 tons of cocaine
in Los Angeles concealed in an unguarded warehouse and six tons
in New York City hidden inside barrels of caustic powder -- both
originated in Cali.

    Barco's war, however, is not primarily intended to keep the
rest of the world safe from Colombian drugs. He views the
narcos first as a threat to his country, and thus devotes fewer
resources to destroying the Cali clan than the other cartels.
Says General Maza: "In 1984 we didn't have a clear idea of the
dimension of the problem. We didn't realize that they had our
society practically under their control. They are killing
Colombia. We have to resolve this problem first. Then we can
take part in the world fight."

    Gacha has responded to the spotlight in typically ugly
fashion. His organization plans to introduce American drug users
to basuco, a partly processed coca plant that is later mixed
with ether to purify it into cocaine. Basuco, which is just as
addictive as crack, has long been used by poor Colombians, who
mix it with tobacco and smoke it. Says a cartel source: "Gacha
thinks basuco will be very popular among poor Americans. He
blames America for the injury his business has suffered and
wants to punish the U.S."

    There are signs that the cartel's monopoly on the coke
trade is waning. Recent bombings in Bogota may be the work of
free-lance criminals seeking to muscle in on the families'
business. Authorities believe new organizations are being set
up in Peru, Bolivia, Mexico and the U.S.

    Meanwhile, Colombia's government and its most wanted
criminals feint and jab at one another. For Barco, the capture
of Escobar or Gacha would justify his unyielding crusade. For
the drug thugs, the assassination or abduction of a top
government official would convince the public that a deal is
needed. Moans Interior Minister Carlos Lemos Simmonds: "I go
from an armored car to a guarded office. My feet have not
touched the streets for weeks. My family lives in terror." An
understandable lament, but Lemos and his family -- as well as
the rest of the country -- will continue to live in terror as
long as the U.S. demand for cocaine remains keen and Colombia's
drug masters insist on being the main suppliers.